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DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW
New York Court of Appeals commingles two state constitutional
provisions to suppress station-house confession procured follow-
ing an illegal arrest
Courts have often struggled with the long-standing principle
that any evidence acquired by an illegal search or seizure must be
suppressed as the "fruit of the poisonous tree."' Recognizing the
genuine demands of law enforcement,2 the United States Supreme
Court has declined to extend this exclusionary rule to all evidence
that would not have been procured "but for" an illegal search or
1 See Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939) ("trial judge must give oppor-
tunity ... to the accused to prove that a substantial portion of the case against him was a
fruit of the poisonous tree"); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392
(1920) (exclusionary rule extends to indirect as well as direct products of illegality); Weeks
v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (evidence seized during unlawful search sup-
pressed). Justice Holmes stated in strict terms that "[tihe essence of a provision forbidding
the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not
be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all." Silverthorne, 251 U.S. at 392.
See generally 4 W. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 11.4, at 369-72 (2d ed. 1987) (history of
"fruit of poisonous tree" doctrine); Comment, The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree: Recent
Developments as Viewed Through Its Exceptions, 31 U. MIAMI L. REv. 615, 615-17 (1977)
(same).
The exclusionary rule of the fourth amendment was originally adopted in federal prose-
cutions to bar illegally seized primary evidence. See Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398. Primary evi-
dence is obtained directly by virtue of the illicit conduct and hence becomes the "poisonous
tree." See Pitler, "The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree" Revisited and Shepardized, 56 CALIF.
L. REv. 579, 581 (1968). When primary evidence leads to other evidence, this secondary
evidence becomes the "fruit" of the poisonous tree. Id.; see also W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 9.3(a), at 734 (1985) ("poisonous tree" can be illegal arrest, search,
interrogation procedures, or identification practices); R. MCNAMARA, CONsTrrruTIONAL LIhI-
TATIONS ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 15.01 to 15.08, at 231-40 (1982) (devices to exclude
evidence at trial).
Justice Holmes succinctly expressed the policy reasons behind the broad exclusionary
rule: "[Flacts thus obtained [do not] become sacred and inaccessible. If knowledge of them
is gained from an independent source they may be proved like any others, but the knowl-
edge gained by the Government's own wrong cannot be used by it in the way proposed."
Silverthorne, 251 U.S. at 392.
The United States Supreme Court has incorporated the exclusionary rule into the re-
quirements of due process and has therefore made the rule applicable to state courts by
operation of the fourteenth amendment. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655-56 (1961). See
generally Comment, The Fourth Amendment and Tainted Confessions: Admissibility as a
Policy Decision, 13 Hous. L. REv. 753, 753-55 (1976) [hereinafter Comment, Fourth Amend-
ment] (history and development of exclusionary rule).
" See United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 474 (1980) (Constitution does not require
that person illegally detained be forever granted immunity from prosecution); Brown v. Ili-
nois, 422 U.S. 590, 608-09 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring) (rule's deterrent purposes do not
outweigh its costs).
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seizure.3 Instead, the Court has suggested that three criteria be
evaluated to determine whether a confession is the "fruit of the
poisonous tree":4 (1) the temporal proximity of the unlawful search
or seizure and the confession;5 (2) the presence of intervening cir-
3 See Brown, 422 U.S. at 603; Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963).
The Court in Brown noted that "[i]t is entirely possible ... that persons arrested illegally
frequently may decide to confess, as an act of free will unaffected by the initial illegality."
Brown, 422 U.S. at 603; see also Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 487-88 (confession given by defend-
ant who was released and who voluntarily returned to station house was untainted by his
illegal arrest). See generally W. LAFAvE, supra note 1, § 11.4(a), at 372 (discussing extent
of illegal taint and Supreme Court's rejection of "but for" test).
In determining whether derivative evidence is the fruit of the poisonous tree, the Court
in Wong Sun posed the following question: "[G]ranting establishment of the primary illegal-
ity ... has [the challenged evidence] been come at by exploitation of that illegality or in-
stead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint[?]" See Wong
Sun, 371 U.S. at 488 (quoting MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE oF GumT 221 (1959)); see also Broeder,
Wong Sun v. United States: A Study in Faith and Hope, 42 NEB. L. Rav. 483, 520 (1962)
(Court in Wong Sun extended application of exclusionary rule to oral statements, but re-
fused to declare unequivocally that all oral statements made by accused under unlawful
arrest must be suppressed); Comment, Fourth Amendment, supra note 1, at 763 (Wong Sun
Court perceived that there will be situations in which confession, constituting an act of free
will, will be unaffected by illegality).
4 Brown, 422 U.S. at 603-04; accord People v. Johnson, 66 N.Y.2d 398, 407, 488 N.E.2d
439, 445, 497 N.Y.S.2d 618, 624-25 (1985). Wong Sun marked the Supreme Court's first
attempt at establishing guidelines for determining whether derivative evidence is the "fruit
of the poisonous tree." See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488; see also Comment, Fourth Amend-
ment, supra note 1, at 761-63 (Brown praised for clarifying Wong Sun decision); cf. Note,
Criminal Procedure-Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule-Miranda Warnings Do Not
Per Se Render Admissible a Confession Following an Arrest Which Violates Fourth
Amendment, 25 EMORY L.J. 227, 239-40 (1976) (critique of Brown). See generally Comment,
Fruit of the Poisonous Tree-A Plea for Relevant Criteria, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 1136, 1148-51
(1967) (evaluating three criteria).
A number of courts have concluded that a confession that follows an illegal arrest is
admissible if it passes the traditional voluntariness test of the fifth amendment. See W.
LAFAvE, supra note 1, § 11.4(b), at 390 n.98. However, the Supreme Court has stated that
the burden of proving admissibility rests on the prosecution and that compliance with the
fifth amendment voluntariness test is merely a threshold requirement. Wong Sun, 371 U.S.
at 504; accord People v. Martinez, 37 N.Y.2d 662, 668, 339 N.E.2d 162, 165, 376 N.Y.S.2d
469, 473-74 (1975) (burden on prosecution to demonstrate admissibility).
In addition to other factors, courts evaluating the validity of a confession will consider
whether a suspect was given Miranda warnings. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-
73 (1966). Under the rule of Miranda, a suspect must be warned that he has a right to
remain silent, that if he waives this right, any statement that he makes may be used against
him, and that he has a right to an attorney, either retained or appointed. Id.; see also
Brown, 422 U.S. at 603 (reading of Miranda warnings, though relevant, is not sole factor to
consider in determining whether confession is obtained by exploitation of illegal arrest);
Mapp, 367 U.S. at 648 (constitutional guarantee against unlawful searches and seizures
would otherwise be reduced to "a form of words"). But see W. LAFAvE, supra note 1, §
11.4(b), at 390 n.100 (some courts adopt position that full compliance with Miranda makes
confession admissible notwithstanding prior illegal arrest).
5 See Brown, 422 U.S. at 603. This factor has been cited as the most ambiguous since a
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cumstances; and (3) the purpose and flagrancy of the police mis-
conduct.7 The New York Court of Appeals has similarly conceded
that "at some point the chain of causation leading from the illegal
activity to the challenged evidence may become so attenuated that
the 'taint' of the original illegality is removed."8 Recently, however,
in People v. Harris," the New York Court of Appeals held that a
station-house confession obtained from a murder suspect approxi-
mately one hour after a warrantless entry into his apartment was
inadmissible under article I, section 12 of the New York State
Constitution.10
In Harris, a five-day murder investigation yielded probable
cause to believe that the defendant had murdered his girlfriend."
The police arrested the defendant in his apartment without a war-
rant, thus violating the rule established in Payton v. New York.' 2
prolonged detention may often be a more serious exploitation of an unlawful search and
seizure than a brief one. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 220 (1979) (Stevens, J.,
concurring). The courts' decisions more often turn on events occurring during the time
lapse, rather than on the time span itself. See Note, supra note 4, at 240-41.
Because of the ambiguity of the "temporal proximity factor," courts essentially resort
to a balancing of the other two Brown factors. See W. LAFAvE, supra note 1, § 11.4(b), at
402; see also Brown, 422 U.S. at 612 (Powell, J., concurring) (voluntary confession after
Miranda warning should be admitted).
6 See Brown, 422 U.S. at 603-04; see also Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 365 (1972)
(appearance before magistrate and setting of bail were sufficient intervening circumstances).
7 See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 604 (1975). Justice Powell determined that this
factor is the most crucial. Id. at 611 (Powell, J., concurring); see also Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at
491 (defendant suggested no impropriety in interrogation itself); People v. Rogers, 52
N.Y.2d 527, 534, 421 N.E.2d 491, 493, 439 N.Y.S.2d 96, 98 (no indication that arrest was
orchestrated in such manner as to provoke defendant to overcome his reluctance to commu-
nicate), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 898 (1981); Commonwealth v. Davis, 462 Pa. 27, 30, 336 A.2d
888, 889 (confession motivated by defendant's own sense of remorse, not by police interroga-
tion), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975).
8 See Rogers, 52 N.Y.2d at 533, 421 N.E.2d at 493, 439 N.Y.S.2d at 98. A defendant's
request to suppress evidence will be denied if significant intervening events justify the con-
clusion that the evidence was not the product of the illegal activity. See id.; see also People
v. Leary, 145 A.D.2d 732, 734, 535 N.Y.S.2d 471, 473 (3d Dep't 1988) (presentation to de-
fendant of incriminating statements made by codefendant constituted sufficient intervening
circumstance to purge taint of defendant's illegal arrest), appeal denied, 73 N.Y.2d 1017,
539 N.E.2d 600, 541 N.Y.S.2d 772 (1989).
0 77 N.Y.2d 434, 570 N.E.2d 1051, 568 N.Y.S.2d 702 (1991).
10 Id. at 440, 570 N.E.2d at 1055, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 706.
n Id. at 435, 570 N.E.2d at 1051, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 702.
12 445 U.S. 573 (1980). The Payton rule states that the fourth amendment prohibits
police from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home in order to
make a routine felony arrest. Id. at 603. In Harris, the trial court found that the police had
probable cause to arrest the defendant, that they went to his apartment intending to make a
warrantless arrest, and that the defendant permitted them to enter only because he was
submitting to their authority. See People v. Harris, 72 N.Y.2d 614, 617-18, 532 N.E.2d 1229,
1200
1991] SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE 1201
Following the unlawful arrest, the defendant was taken to the sta-
tion house, where he signed a written confession after repeated Mi-
randa warnings.13 Based partly on the station-house confession,
the defendant was convicted of second-degree murder in the su-
preme court. 4
The appellate division affirmed the conviction, 15 but the court
of appeals reversed, concluding that the confession should have
been suppressed on fourth amendment grounds because it was not
shown to have been sufficiently attenuated from the warrantless
arrest."6 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and
reversed the New York Court of Appeals' decision to suppress the
defendant's confession. 17 In a five-to-four decision, the Court held
that the illegal action was the officers' entry into the apartment,
not their arrest of the defendant, and that their exit from the
apartment broke the causal connection between the illegal entry
and the subsequent inculpatory statement." Satisfied that the sup-
1231, 536 N.Y.S.2d 1, 3 (1988), rev'd, 110 S. Ct. 1640 (1990). Based on these findings, the
trial court concluded that "no clearer violation of the Payton rule could be established." Id.
13 Harris, 77 N.Y.2d at 435, 570 N.E.2d at 1051, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 702. Prior to executing
the written statement in the station house, the defendant made an oral confession to the
police in his apartment after pouring himself a glass of wine. See Harris, 72 N.Y.2d at 617,
532 N.E.2d at 1230, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 2. Subsequent to executing the written statement, the
police required the defendant to make a videotaped confession despite his statement that he
was tired and did not wish to speak anymore. Id. The apartment confession was suppressed
as the direct product of the warrantless entry; furthermore, the videotaped confession was
suppressed as involuntary. Id. at 617-18, 532 N.E.2d at 1230-31, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 2-3; see
also Kelder & Lewin, Criminal Procedure, 40 SYRACUSE L. REv. 245, 273-74 (1989) (facts of
Harris case complicated decision).
Miranda warnings were repeated to the defendant prior to each confession, although
only the written confession was at issue on appeal. See Harris, 72 N.Y.2d at 617, 532 N.E.2d
at 1230, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 2.
124 Harris, 72 N.Y.2d at 614, 532 N.E.2d at 1229, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 1.
15 People v. Harris, 124 A.D.2d 472, 472, 507 N.Y.S.2d 823, 823 (1st Dep't 1986), rev'd,
72 N.Y.2d 614, 532 N.E.2d 1229, 536 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1988), rev'd, 110 S. Ct. 1640 (1990).
Is Harris, 72 N.Y.2d at 623, 532 N.E.2d at 1234, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 6. The court applied
the factors delineated in Brown. Id. at 620, 532 N.E.2d at 1232, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 4; see also
supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text (discussing Brown factors).
In a concurring opinion, Judge Titone questioned the application of the Brown analysis
to cases involving Payton violations. See Harris, 72 N.Y.2d at 625, 532 N.E.2d at 1235, 536
N.Y.S.2d at 7 (Titone, J., concurring). He noted that "[a]lthough we sometimes use legal
shorthand and refer to the police action as an 'illegal arrest,' the true wrong in Payton cases
lies not in the arrest but in the unlawful entry into a dwelling without proper judicial au-
thorization." Id. at 625-26, 532 N.E.2d at 1236, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 8 (footnote omitted; empha-
sis in original).
17 New York v. Harris, 110 S. Ct. 1640, 1642, 1644-45 (1990). See generally Simien,
Search and Seizure, 5f LA. L. REV. 405, 422-23 (1990) (discussing New York v. Harris).
Is Harris, 110 S. Ct. at 1644.
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pression of incriminating evidence acquired at the defendant's
apartment was sufficient to deter violations of the Payton rule,",
the Court declined to extend the rule's exclusionary reach to the
statement given by the defendant at the police station.20
On remand, the New York Court of Appeals seized upon its
authority to conduct an independent state review to determine
whether evidence admissible under the United States Constitution
should be suppressed under the state constitution.21 Writing for
the court, Judge Simons concluded that "the Supreme Court's rule
does not adequately protect the search and seizure rights of citi-
zens of New York. '22 Since the federal and state provisions regard-
ing searches and seizures share identical language as well as a com-
mon history,23 the court turned to another provision of the state
11 Id. at 1643; see also Simien, supra note 17, at 422 (Harris distinguishable from case
in which officers obtain statement while present within unlawfully entered residence).
2 See Harris, 110 S. Ct. at 1644. See generally Pitler, supra note 1, at 586 (justification
for not invoking exclusionary rule). In rejecting the court of appeals' argument that suppres-
sion of the station-house confession would deter future Payton violations, the Supreme
Court reasoned that since police may interrogate a suspect once they have probable cause,
they have no incentive to violate the Payton rule in the hopes of securing an inculpatory
statement. See Harris, 110 S. Ct. at 1644. The Supreme Court distinguished cases relied on
by the court of appeals because in each of those cases the police lacked probable cause. Id.
at 1643; see also Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 688-89 (1982) (relied on by court of
appeals in first Harris decision); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 205 (1979) (same);
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 591 (1975) (same).
21 Harris, 77 N.Y.2d at 437, 570 N.E.2d at 1052, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 703. "Sufficient rea-
sons appearing, a State court may adopt a different construction of a similar State provision
unconstrained by a contrary Supreme Court interpretation of the Federal counterpart." Id.
at 437-38, 570 N.E.2d at 1053, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 704; see also Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S.
40, 60-61 (1968) (state free to develop its own law of search and seizure to meet needs of
local law enforcement); People ex rel. Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 553, 557, 503
N.E.2d 492, 494, 510 N.Y.S.2d 844, 846 (1986) (disputed conduct must satisfy both state and
federal constitutions).
The New York Court of Appeals has declined to read the fourth amendment of the
United States Constitution and article I, section 12 of the New York State Constitution as
coextensive and has suppressed evidence on state grounds. See People v. Johnson, 66
N.Y.2d 398, 412, 488 N.E.2d 439, 449, 497 N.Y.S.2d 618, 628 (1985) (Titone, J., concurring);
see also People v. P.J. Video, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 296, 302, 501 N.E.2d 556, 560, 508 N.Y.S.2d
907, 911 (1986) (article I, section 12 requires more exacting standard for issuance of search
warrants), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1091 (1987). But cf. Johnson, 66 N.Y.2d at 408, 488
N.E.2d at 446, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 625 (Titone, J., concurring) (exclusion of evidence is not
command of article I, section 12, but rather judicially declared rule of evidence that legisla-
ture is free to abrogate).
22 Harris, 77 N.Y.2d at 437, 570 N.E.2d at 1052-53, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 703-04.
21 See P.J. Video, 68 N.Y.2d at 304 n.4, 501 N.E.2d at 561 n.4, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 912 n.4;
see also Johnson, 66 N.Y.2d at 406, 488 N.E.2d at 445, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 624 (historically,
New York courts have designed their rules to promote consistency in interpretation given to
both clauses). The language of the two provisions is identical:
1202 [Vol. 65:1195
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constitution.24 Specifically, the court focused on the New York
State Constitution's right-to-counsel clause,25 which provides pro-
tections extending "well beyond the right to counsel afforded by
the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and other
State Constitutions. 2
6
Under New York law, after a felony complaint is filed and an
arrest warrant is issued, the defendant's right to counsel indelibly
attaches and may not be waived unless in the presence of coun-
sel.2 7 Under federal law, however, criminal proceedings do not nec-
essarily commence upon the issuance of an arrest warrant, and the
police may therefore interrogate a suspect in the absence of his
lawyer without violating the suspect's right to counsel.28 The court
of appeals, raising this issue for the first time on remand, feared
that police would be enticed to arrest a criminal suspect without a
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the Persons or things to
be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12. This identical language supports a policy of
uniform construction by federal and state courts. See People v. Ponder, 54 N.Y.2d 160, 165,
429 N.E.2d 735, 737, 445 N.Y.S.2d 57, 59 (1981).
24 See Harris, 77 N.Y.2d at 438, 570 N.E.2d at 1053, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 704. To determine
whether the state constitution should be interpreted differently from the federal Constitu-
tion, the court of appeals has suggested that the following factors be considered: (1) any
preexisting state statutory or common law defining the scope of the individual right in ques-
tion; (2) history and traditions of the state in its protection of that right; (3) any identifica-
tion of that right as being one of peculiar state or local concern; and (4) distinctive attitudes
of state citizenry toward the definition, scope, or protection of that right. See P.J. Video, 68
N.Y.2d at 302-03, 501 N.E.2d at 560, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 911.
26 Harris, 77 N.Y.2d at 439-40, 570 N.E.2d at 1054, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 705 (citing N.Y.
CONsT. art. I, § 6).
28 People v. Davis, 75 N.Y.2d 517, 521, 553 N.E.2d 1008, 1011, 554 N.Y.S.2d 460, 463
(1990); accord People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 483-84, 348 N.E.2d 894, 897, 384 N.Y.S.2d
419, 422 (1976).
2 See People v. Samuels, 49 N.Y.2d 218, 223, 400 N.E.2d 1344, 1347, 424 N.Y.S.2d 892,
895 (1980); People v. Settles, 46 N.Y.2d 154, 162-63, 385 N.E.2d 612, 616, 412 N.Y.S.2d 874,
879 (1978); see also People v. Skinner, 52 N.Y.2d 24, 32, 417 N.E.2d 501, 505, 436 N.Y.S.2d
207, 211 (1980) (waiver of right to counsel ineffective when defendant who was known to
have retained legal counsel prior to commencement of formal proceeding was questioned in
noncustodial setting).
28 Harris, 77 N.Y.2d at 439-40, 570 N.E.2d at 1054, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 705; see also
United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 188 (1984) (federal right to counsel attaches when
judicial proceedings initiated, not necessarily when arrest warrant issued); Brewer v. Wil-
liams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977) (same). See generally W. LAFAvE & J. IsRAEL, supra note 1,
§ 6.4, at 277-79 (controversy exists concerning when federal right to counsel attaches).
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warrant in order to circumvent the protective right to counsel.2 9
The interplay between New York's unique right-to-counsel rule
and the state's search and seizure provision furnished what the
court perceived as a compelling reason for deviating from the Su-
preme Court's judgment.30 The court therefore concluded that the
state constitution compels the suppression of statements obtained
from an accused following an arrest made in violation of Payton,
absent a showing of attenuation.3 1
In a scathing dissent, Judge Bellacosa, joined by Chief Judge
Wachtler, attacked the majority for "metamorphosiz[ing] the Pay-
ton private dwelling sanctuary into the public precinct house," and
for further distorting the jurisprudence by converting Payton's
fourth amendment dwelling right into a state version of the per-
sonal right to counsel. 2 Of his seven caustic observations regarding
the majority opinion, Judge Bellacosa was most disconcerted by
the majority's implication that the police were legally and constitu-
tionally required to commence a criminal proceeding as soon as
they believed that they had probable cause. 3
In reaching its decision, the Harris court relied on People v.
Samue is,3 4 which established that a defendant's right to counsel
attaches when a felony complaint is filed and an arrest warrant is
issued. 5 Judge Bellacosa argued that this rule was inapplicable on
its face because Harris was arrested without the issuance of a war-
rant, the filing of a felony complaint, or the commencement of a
19 See Harris, 77 N.Y.2d at 440, 570 N.E.2d at 1055, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 706. The court
emphasized that the police "should not enjoy greater latitude simply because they neglected
to obtain a warrant, as Payton requires, and entered the apartment illegally." Id.
30 See id. at 439-41, 570 N.E.2d at 1054-55, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 705-06.
"' See id.
32 Id. at 447, 570 N.E.2d at 1059, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 710 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting). Judge
Bellacosa asserted that the majority's approach was fundamentally flawed because it consid-
ered "the infringement of some artificially triggered right to counsel," rather than a pure
fourth amendment Payton right. Id. at 445, 570 N.E.2d at 1057, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 708 (Bel-
lacosa, J., dissenting).
33 Id. at 442-43, 570 N.E.2d at 1056, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 707 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
"The police were under no constitutional or legal obligation to obtain a warrant and thus
commence the criminal proceeding at a particular time which some court might thereafter
determine to be the precise moment of truth." Id. at 445, 570 N.E.2d at 1057, 568 N.Y.S.2d
at 708 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting); see also Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 309-10
(1966) (defendant did not have constitutional right to be arrested).
49 N.Y.2d 218, 400 N.E.2d 1344, 424 N.Y.S.2d 892 (1980).
35 Id. at 223, 400 N.E.2d at 1346, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 895; accord Harris, 77 N.Y.2d at 439-
40, 570, N.E.2d at 1054, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 705.
1204 [Vol. 65:1195
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criminal proceeding.36 Furthermore, he could not understand how
the objective of deterring violations of Payton's private dwelling
protection was served by suppressing a subsequent station-house
confession.3 7 In conclusion, Judge Bellacosa condemned the major-
ity for disregarding the Supreme Court's wisdom and experience in
the interpretation and application of Payton, thus "relegat[ing]
th[e] Supreme Court's work to an academic judicial exercise with
no consequence for the real outcome of this case. 38
It is submitted that the court of appeals' suppression of the
station-house confession was improper. The court's decision is not
only inconsistent with federal law, but also with the state's own
historical precedents. Furthermore, the court erroneously applied
New York's special right-to-counsel rules to a strict Payton viola-
tion case. Finally, the court's decision unduly burdens law enforce-
ment activities and inadequately protects society from admitted
murderers.
Based on New York's peculiar historical precedents, the court
of appeals perceived a need for a more stringent search and seizure
policy to discourage New York officials from violating Payton in
their efforts to secure incriminating statements before the right to
counsel attaches.3 9 It is unlikely, however, that suppressing subse-
quent station-house confessions will deter future Payton viola-
tions, or that the police in Harris even intended to deprive the
defendant of his right to counsel.4 ° Moreover, the court's decision
actually appears to be inconsistent with New York's historical
38 See Harris, 77 N.Y.2d at 444, 570 N.E.2d at 1057, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 708 (Bellacosa, J.,
dissenting); see also Samuels, 49 N.Y.2d at 223, 400 N.E.2d at 1347, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 895
(statements obtained in absence of counsel after filing of felony complaint must be
suppressed).
37 See Harris, 77 N.Y.2d at 445, 570 N.E.2d at 1057, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 708 (Bellacosa, J.,
dissenting).
Id. at 447, 570 N.E.2d at 1059, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 710 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
39 See id. at 440, 570 N.E.2d at 1055, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 706.
40 See id. at 445, 570 N.E.2d at 1057, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 708 (Belacosa, J., dissenting). "It
is speculative that the police intended to violate defendant's Payton right and even more
speculative that they intended to evade any of his New York counsel rights." Id.; see also
People v. Drain, 73 N.Y.2d 107, 107, 535 N.E.2d 630, 631, 538 N.Y.S.2d 500, 501 (1989)
(relevant evidence not suppressed if little or no deterrent benefit anticipated from
exclusion).
The Supreme Court recognized that because the police had justification to question
Harris prior to his arrest, his subsequent statement was not an exploitation of the illegal
entry into his home. See New York v. Harris, 110 S. Ct. 1640, 1644 (1990); see also United
States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 471 (1980) (no need to suppress evidence not acquired
through exploitation of defendant's rights).
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precedents.4' New York courts have carved out various exceptions
to the Payton rule and, in certain instances, have refused to sup-
press evidence notwithstanding a failure by police to obtain an ar-
rest warrant.42 Furthermore, the court of appeals has refused to
recognize a deliberate attempt by police to circumvent a defend-
ant's right to counsel as grounds for suppressing testimony.4 Thus,
the protection provided by New York's right-to-counsel clause has
actually been subject to judicial constriction rather than
expansion.44
41 See generally Shechtman, Harris' Expansion of Defendant's Rights At Odds With
State's History, Practice, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 7, 1991, at 1, col. 1 (criticizing court of appeals'
decision in Harris as inconsistent with prior New York law).
43 See, e.g., People v. Kozlowski, 69 N.Y.2d 761, 762-63, 505 N.E.2d 611, 612-13, 513
N.Y.S.2d 101, 102-03 (1987) (police may approach private home by public walkway, knock
on front door, and make inquiries of owner who answered); People v. Minley, 68 N.Y.2d 952,
953, 502 N.E.2d 1002, 1003, 510 N.Y.S.2d 87, 88 (1986) (arrest made after suspect "directed"
to come out of his home did not constitute Payton violation) People v. Thomas, 164 A.D.2d
874, 874, 559 N.Y.S.2d 380, 381 (2d Dep't 1990) (defendant's arrest in his home resulting
from continuous pursuit by police that originated in public place did not violate Payton),
appeal denied, 77 N.Y.2d 883, 571 N.E.2d 96, 568 N.Y.S.2d 926 (1991); People v. Marzan,
161 A.D.2d 416, 416, 555 N.Y.S.2d 345, 345 (1st Dep't) (warrantless arrest of defendant in
hallway of apartment building did not constitute Payton violation), appeal denied, 76
N.Y.2d 860, 561 N.E.2d 900, 560 N.Y.S.2d 1000 (1990); People v. Roe, 136 A.D.2d 140, 143,
525 N.Y.S.2d 966, 967-68 (3d Dep't 1988) (use of deception that did not entail coercion to
lure arrestee from home did not violate Payton), aff'd, 73 N.Y.2d 1004, 539 N.E.2d 587, 541
N.Y.S.2d 759 (1989).
Some commentators have observed that the exceptions to Payton may be swallowing up
the rule. See Kelder & Lewin, supra note 13, at 276-77 n.176 (exceptions to Payton caused
disparity between Harris majority and dissenters).
48 See People v. Robles, 72 N.Y.2d 689, 692, 533 N.E.2d 240, 240-41, 536 N.Y.S.2d 401,
401-02 (1988) (authorities waited until disposition of prior unrelated charges before ques-
tioning defendant); see also People v. Caviano, 148 Misc. 2d 426, 437, 560 N.Y.S.2d 932, 939
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1990) (despite existence of probable cause, police intentionally
delayed obtaining arrest warrant so that they could question defendant before right to coun-
sel attached).
, See People v. Bing, 76 N.Y.2d 331, 337, 558 N.E.2d 1011, 1014, 559 N.Y.S.2d 474, 477
(1990). In Bing, the suspect was represented by counsel in Ohio on prior pending charges,
but waived his right to counsel while being questioned in New York on unrelated charges.
Id. at 335, 558 N.E.2d at 1012-13, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 475-76. The Bing court overruled People
v. Bartolomeo, 53 N.Y.2d 225, 423 N.E.2d 371, 440 N.Y.S.2d 894 (1981), which held that a
suspect represented by counsel on a prior pending charge may not waive his rights in the
absence of counsel and answer questions on new, unrelated charges. Id at 229, 423 N.E.20 at
373, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 896. The Bing court held that the right to counsel did not require
exclusion of statements made to police in response to inquiries about crimes unrelated to
those on which the suspect had representation. Bing, 76 N.Y.2d at 351, 558 N.E.2d at 1022-
23, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 485. As Judge Bellacosa indicated in his dissenting opinion, the Bing
case may have been miscited by the majority. See Harris, 77 N.Y.2d at 444, 570 N.E.2d at
1057, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 708 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting). See generally W. LAFAvE & J. IsRAEL,
supra note 1, § 6.4(e), at 278 (criticizing New York's right-to-counsel clause).
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New York's right-to-counsel clause encompasses two distinct
situations.4 First, the right to counsel indelibly attaches when for-
mal proceedings have commenced. 46 This rule was not directly ap-
plicable to the facts of Harris,47 and the court's concern that police
would delay the institution of proceedings in order to secure a
statement before the right to counsel attaches is speculative at
best.4" Second, the right to counsel attaches when an uncharged
individual in police custody has retained or requested an attor-
ney.49 Because the defendant in Harris had neither retained nor
requested legal counsel, this rule was also inapplicable.50 It is as-
serted that at the time Harris signed his written confession in the
police station, his right to counsel had not yet attached, and that
his waiver was therefore recognizable. Since New York's peculiar
right-to-counsel clause had not yet been invoked, no compelling
reason existed for the court of appeals to deviate from the United
States Supreme Court's decision.5 The Harris case involved a pure
'1 See Bing, 76 N.Y.2d at 339, 558 N.E.2d at 1015, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 478; Robles, 72
N.Y.2d at 695-96, 533 N.E.2d at 243, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 404; People v. Cunningham, 49 N.Y.2d
203, 208, 400 N.E.2d 360, 363, 424 N.Y.S.2d 421, 424 (1980).
" See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
'1 See supra note 36 and accompanying text; cf. People v. Gloskey, 105 A.D.2d 871, 872,
482 N.Y.S.2d 82, 84 (3d Dep't 1984) (declining to extend Samuels to situation in which
police officer was under mistaken belief that criminal proceedings had commenced).
"I See supra notes 20 and 43 and accompanying text.
49 See, e.g., People v. Bing, 76 N.Y.2d 331, 340, 558 N.E.2d 1011, 1015, 559 N.Y.S.2d
474, 478 (1990) (statements admissible because suspect was represented by counsel only on
unrelated charges); Cunningham, 49 N.Y.2d at 206, 400 N.E.2d at 365, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 423
(defendant unequivocally stated desire to consult with attorney, before speaking); People v.
Rogers, 48 N.Y.2d 167, 169, 397 N.E.2d 709, 710-11, 422 N.Y.S.2d 18, 19 (1979) (once attor-
ney has been retained, police should cease questioning defendant in custody unless attorney
is present); People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 483, 348 N.E.2d 894, 897, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419,
421-22 (1976) (representation on unrelated charge not sufficient to invoke right to counsel);
People v. Taylor, 27 N.Y.2d 327, 332, 266 N.E.2d 630, 633, 318 N.Y.S.2d 1, 5 (1971) (incul-
patory statements admitted because defendant neither requested counsel nor had one been
retained or appointed).
80 See Harris, 77 N.Y.2d at 443, 570 N.E.2d at 1056, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 707 (Bellacosa, J.,
dissenting). The defendant not only waived his right to an attorney while being questioned,
but also expressly requested that he be tried without defense counsel. Id.
51 See supra note 32 and accompanying text. The New York State Supreme Court,
Appellate Division, has relied on the United States Supreme Court decision in Harris in
several recent cases. See, e.g., People v. Tariq, 170 A.D.2d 716, 565 N.Y.S.2d 614, 616 (3d
Dep't 1991) (incriminating statements made by defendant after he was shown physical evi-
dence obtained pursuant to valid search warrant admissible despite Payton violation); Peo-
ple v. Ayala, 165 A.D.2d 875, 879, 560 N.Y.S.2d 656, 657-58 (2d Dep't 1990) (Payton viola-
tion did not require suppression of inculpatory statement made at police station two hours
later and after two Miranda warnings), appeal denied, 77 N.Y.2d 903, 572 N.E.2d 618, 569
N.Y.S.2d 935 (1991); People v. Marzan, 161 A.D.2d 416, 416, 555 N.Y.S.2d 345, 345 (1st
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Payton violation issue, and the court's analysis should have fo-
cused on whether the defendant's confession was sufficiently atten-
uated from his illegal arrest.5
2
Although the state has a compelling interest in protecting the
rights of criminal suspects, it has a superior interest in protecting
society from an admitted murderer. The Payton rule, intended to
protect the sanctity of a suspect's home, is preserved by sup-
pressing any evidence acquired while in the home. The effect of
suppressing a defendant's voluntary, station-house confession is to
burden criminal prosecutions without providing a corresponding
deterrent to illegal police action. The Harris court, citing the inter-
play between two separate and distinct state constitutional provi-
sions, suppressed a station-house confession despite the existence
of probable cause to arrest the defendant. As the dissent correctly
exhorted, "[t]he history of [the] NY Constitution... and its proud
right to counsel tradition.., do not support leapfrogging beyond
the United States Supreme Court's decision in this procedurally
convoluted case."5 3
Maryann Gianchino
New York Court of Appeals concludes law enforcement officials
must have reasonable suspicion that a residence contains illegal
drugs before conducting a "canine sniff" of the premises
The fourth amendment of the United States Constitution, as
well as its New York State Constitution counterpart, is designed to
safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures.1 Exactly
Dep't) (en route to Central Booking and before Miranda warnings given, defendant sponta-
neously made admissible statements), appeal denied, 76 N.Y.2d 860, 561 N.E.2d 900, 560
N.Y.S.2d 1000 (1990).
'2 See Harris, 77 N.Y.2d at 446, 570 N.E.2d at 1058, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 709 (Bellacosa, J.,
dissenting). Judge Bellacosa cites a key chain of attenuating events: change of scene from
"protected" dwelling to "unprotected" precinct; passage of about one hour; and renewed
Miranda warnings and waivers. Id. (citing People v. Harris, 124 A.D.2d 472, 475, 507
N.Y.S.2d 823, 824 (1st Dep't 1986), rev'd, 72 N.Y.2d 614, 532 N.E.2d 1229, 536 N.Y.S.2d 1
(1988), rev'd, 110 S. Ct. 1640 (1990)).
53 Id. at 447, 570 N.E.2d at 1059, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 710 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
1 See U.S. CONsT. amend. IV. The fourth amendment provides the following:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue, but on probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
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